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Abstract. As modern computing moves towards smaller devices and
powerful cloud platforms, more and more computation is being delegated
to powerful service providers. Interactive proofs are a widely-used model
to design efficient protocols for verifiable computation delegation.
Rational proofs are payment-based interactive proofs. The payments are
designed to incentivize the provers to give correct answers. If the provers
misreport the answer then they incur a payment loss of at least 1/u,
where u is the utility gap of the protocol.
In this work, we tightly characterize the power of rational proofs that are
super efficient, that is, require only logarithmic time and communication
for verification. We also characterize the power of single-round rational
protocols that require only logarithmic space and randomness for ver-
ification. Our protocols have strong (that is, polynomial, logarithmic,
and even constant) utility gap. Finally, we show when and how ratio-
nal protocols can be converted to give the completeness and soundness
guarantees of classical interactive proofs.
1 Introduction
Most computation today is not done locally by a client, but instead is outsourced
to third-party service providers in exchange for money. Trading computation for
money brings up two problems—(a) how the client can guarantee correctness of
the outsourced computation (without redoing the computation), and (b) how to
design the payment scheme. The two problems are closely related: ideally, we
want the payment scheme to be such that it incentivizes service providers to
perform the computation correctly.
Interactive proofs (IP) are the most well-studied and widely-used theoretical
framework to verify correctness of outsourced computation[8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 20, 21,
22, 29, 32, 38, 39, 46]. In an IP, a weak client (or verifier) interacts with powerful
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service providers (or provers) to determine the correctness of their claim. At
the end, the verifier probabilistically accepts or rejects the claim.3 Interactive
proofs guarantee that, roughly speaking, the verifier accepts a truthful claim with
probability at least 2/3 (completeness) and no strategy of the provers can make
the verifier accept a false claim with probability more than 1/3 (soundness).4.
Rational proofs are payment-based interactive proofs for computation out-
sourcing which leverage the incentives of the service providers. In rational
proofs, the provers act rationally in the game-theoretic sense, that is, they
want to maximize their payment. The payment is designed such that when
the provers maximize their payment, they also end up giving the correct an-
swer. The model of rational proofs (RIP) was introduced by Azar and Micali
in [3]. Since then, many simple and efficient rational protocols have been de-
signed [4, 11, 17, 30, 31, 35, 48].
While rational proofs provide strong theoretical guarantees, there are two
main barriers that separate them from what is often desired in practice. First,
many rational protocols require a polynomial-time verifier—but a “weak” client
is unlikely to be able to spend (say) quadratic time or linear extra space on
verification. Second, many of these protocols strongly rely on the rationality of
the provers. An honest prover may receive only a fraction of a cent more than
a dishonest prover, yet a rational prover is assumed to be incentivized by that
small amount. However, service providers may not always be perfectly rational.
The goal of this paper is to give protocols that overcome these barriers.
Utility Gap. The strength of the guarantee provided by rational proofs is
captured by the notion of utility gap. The high level idea behind utility gap is
that provers who are not perfectly rational may not care about small losses in
payments and may lazily give the incorrect answer. If a rational protocol has a
utility gap of u, then the provers who mislead the verifier to an incorrect answer
are guaranteed to lose at least 1/u. (This is under a normalized budget of 1; if the
budget is scaled up to B, such provers can be made to lose at least B/u.) Thus,
protocols with small utility gap are sound even against provers with bounded
rationality; that is, provers who are only sensitive to large losses.
In this paper, we design efficient rational protocols with strong utility gap—
that is, polynomial, logarithmic, and even constant utility gap. In Section 5, we
show when and how a noticeable utility gap of a rational protocol can be utilized
to achieve the strong completeness and soundness guarantees of a classical proof.
Efficient Protocols. In this paper, we focus on designing rational protocols
with very small overheads in terms of verification time, space, communication
cost and number of rounds. In particular, we design constant-round rational
protocols where the verification time and communication cost are logarithmic in
3 In classical interactive proofs there is no payment—simply acceptance or rejection.
4 More formally, given an input x and a language L, if x ∈ L, the verifier accepts with
probability at least 2/3 (completeness); if x /∈ L, then no strategy of the provers can
make the verifier accept with probability more than 1/3 (soundness).
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the input size n. We also design single-round rational protocols that have only
logarithmic overhead on the verifier’s use of space and randomness.
1.1 Results and Contributions
In this section, we summarize our results and contributions.
Super time-efficient rational proofs. We study the effect of different com-
munication costs and an additional prover on the power of rational proofs with
a highly time-efficient verifier. The utility gap of these protocols is polynomial.
– Constant communication. We show that multiple provers do not add any
power when the communication complexity of the protocol is restricted to be
extremely small—a constant number of bits. That is, we show that the class of
languages that admit a multi-prover rational proof with a O(log n)-time verifier
and O(1) communication is exactly UniformTC0, which is the same as the power
of single-prover version under the same costs [4, 30]. UniformTC0 is the class
of constant depth, polynomial size uniform threshold circuits, that includes
problems such as integer division, and iterated multiplication [1, 2, 33, 34].
– Logarithmic communication. We show that any rational proof with poly-
nomial communication can be simulated by a rational proof with logarithmic
communication that uses an additional prover. Using this property, we improve
the communication complexity of Azar and Micali’s [4] single-prover rational
protocol and show that the class of languages that admit a two-prover rational
proof with logarithmic communication is exactly the class of languages decid-
able by a polynomial time machine that can make polynomially many queries
in parallel to an NP oracle, denoted PNP|| .
5 This is an important class (e.g.,
[10, 37, 41, 42, 47]) that includes optimization problems such as maximum
clique, longest paths, and variants of the traveling salesman problem.
Super space-efficient rational proofs. We achieve even better utility gap
guarantees for the setting where the verifier’s use of space and randomness is
super-efficient. In particular, we exactly characterize the class of single-round
rational proofs with γ(n) utility gap and logarithmic space and randomness
as the class of languages decidable by a polynomial-time machine that makes
O(γ(n)) queries to an NP oracle, denoted P
NP[γ(n)]
|| . Even when γ(n) = O(1)
this bounded-query class is still sufficiently powerful and contains many of the
optimization problems mentioned above.
Thus, highly space-efficient rational protocols with strong guarantees against
imperfectly rational provers can solve many important optimization problems.
Rational proofs with completeness and soundness guarantees. Finally,
we closely compare the two proof systems—rational and classical. We construct
a condition on the expected payments of rational proofs which, if satisfied, turns
5 For parallel oracle queries, both notations PNP|| [47] and P
||NP [4] are used in literature.
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them into a classical interactive proof with completeness and soundness guar-
antees. We first show how to convert a payment-based protocol for a language
L to an accept-reject protocol (without payments) for L such that the expected
payment of the former is exactly the probability with which the verifier accepts
in the latter. We use this to prove that if the expected payments of all inputs
x ∈ L are noticeably far away from that of all inputs x /∈ L, the rational protocol
can be converted to a classical interactive protocol.
1.2 Additional Related Work
Azar and Micali [4] also characterize the classes UniformTC0 and P
NP
|| . Their
characterization of PNP|| requires polynomial communication, which we improve
to logarithmic using a second prover. We also note that all protocols in [4] have
a polynomial utility gap (under a constant budget).
Rational arguments, super-efficient rational proofs where the prover is re-
stricted to be polynomial time, were introduced by Guo et al. [30]. Rational
arguments for all languages in P were given in [31]. Campanelli and Rosario [11]
study sequentially composable rational proofs. Zhang and Blanton [48] design
protocols to outsource matrix multiplications to a rational cloud.
The model of multi-prover rational interactive proofs was introduced by Chen
et al. [17], where they study the power of the model in its full generality (that
is, polynomial-time verifier and polynomial communication). In this paper, we
restrict our focus on the power of multi-prover rational proofs when the verifier’s
running time and communication are restricted to be logarithmic.
Different variants of the rational-proof models have also been studied.
Chen et al. [18] consider rational proofs where the rational provers are non-
cooperative [18]. Inasawa and Kenji [36] consider rational proofs where the verifier
is also rational and wants to minimize the payment to the provers.
Interestingly, the logarithmic-space verifier studied in this paper also happens
to be a streaming algorithm, that is, the verifier does not need to look again at
any input or message bits out of order. Thus, our space-efficient rational proofs
are closely related to the work on streaming interactive proofs [14, 20, 21, 22].
Refereed games is another multi-prover interactive-proof model that leads to
game-theoretic characterizations of various complexity classes [15, 24, 25, 26, 27,
40, 45]. The model of refereed games requires at least one honest prover.
2 Preliminaries
We begin by reviewing the model of rational proofs [3, 17].
Let L be a language, x be an input string and n = |x|. An interactive protocol
is a pair (V, ~P ), where V is the verifier and ~P = (P1, . . . , Pp(n)) is the vector of
provers, and p(n) a polynomial in n. The goal of the verifier is to determine if
x ∈ L. In general, the verifier runs in time polynomial in n and uses polynomial
space as well. In section Section 3, the verifier’s running time is O(log n). In
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Section 4, the verifiers may use polynomial time but are restricted to use O(log n)
space and randomness. The provers are computationally unbounded.6
The verifier can communicate with each prover privately, but no two provers
can communicate with each other. In a round, either each prover sends a message
to the verifier, or the verifier sends a message to each prover, and these two cases
alternate. Without loss of generality, provers send the first round of messages.
The first bit of the first round is the answer bit, denoted by c, and indicates
whether x ∈ L; that is, x ∈ L iff c = 1. We define the communication of the
protocol to be the maximum number of total bits transmitted (summed over all
provers and all rounds) during the protocol. The length of each message and the
number of rounds in a protocol are bounded above by the communication cost.
Let r be the random string used by V . Let ~m be the vector of all messages
exchanged. At the end, the verifier computes the total payment to the provers,
given by a payment function R(x, r, ~m). We restrict the verifier’s budget to be
constant, that is, R ∈ [0, 1] for convenience. We may use negative payments
to emphasize penalties but they can shifted to be non-negative. The protocol
(including the payment function R) is public knowledge.
The verifier outputs the answer bit c at the end of the protocol—thus the
verifier always agrees with the provers.
Each prover Pi can choose a strategy sij : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ for each round j,
which maps the transcript he has seen up until the beginning of round j to the
message he sends in round j. Note that Pi does not send any message when j is
even; in this case sij can be treated as a constant function. Let si = (si1, . . . , sik)
be the strategy vector of Pi and s = (s1, . . . , sp(n)) be the strategy profile of the
provers. Given any input x, randomness r and strategy profile s, we may write the
vector ~m of messages exchanged in the protocol more explicitly as (V, ~P )(x, r, s).
The provers are cooperative and jointly act to maximize the total expected
payment. Thus, before the protocol starts, the provers pre-agree on a strategy
profile s that maximizes u(V,~P)(s;x) = Er[R(x, r, (V,
~P )(x, r, s))]. When (V, ~P )
and x are clear from the context, we write u(s) for u(V,~P)(s;x).
Definition 1 ([17]). For any language L, an interactive protocol (V, ~P ) is a
rational interactive proof protocol for L if, for any x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and any strategy
profile s of the prover(s) such that u(s) = maxs′ u(s
′), c = 1 if and only if x ∈ L.
Similar to classical proofs, single-prover rational interactive protocols, that
is, when ~P = P , are denoted by RIP. Multi-prover interactive protocols, where
~P = (P1, . . . , Pp(n)) are denoted by MRIP. In this paper we study both single-
prover and multi-prover rational proof protocols.
We use poly(n) as a shorthand for a polynomial nk, for some constant k.
2.1 Utility Gap and Budget in Rational Proofs
In the above definitions, we assume that a prover is fully rational, and will give
the correct answer for any increase in expected payment, no matter how small.
6 While the model allows for extremely powerful provers, those considered in this
paper essentially only need to be powerful enough to determine if x ∈ L or x /∈ L.
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However, a prover may be lazy, and unwilling to give the correct answer un-
less the correct answer increases its payment by some minimum amount. This
consideration is particularly important in cloud-based systems, where the pay-
ment must be enough to offset the service providers’ computational costs. This
consideration is analyzed in rational proofs using the budget and utility gap.
A similar concept has been studied in classical interactive proofs, which pro-
vide completeness and soundness guarantees. In particular, they guarantee that
if x ∈ L, there exists ~P such that the verifier accepts (V, ~P ) with probability at
least c, and and if x /∈ L, for all ~P ′, the verifier accepts (V, ~P ′) with probability
at most s where c and s are completeness and soundness parameters respectively,
usually constant with 0 < s < c < 1.
The guarantee analogous to completeness and soundness in rational proofs
is that of utility gap. The notion of utility gap captures the payment loss in-
curred by provers who misreport the answer bit. Since rational proofs are closed
under complement and provers can report x ∈ L by sending c = 1 or report
x /∈ L by reporting c = 0, unlike classical proofs, completeness and soundness
are not separately defined. Instead, utility gap captures the difference between
completeness and soundness for each instance x.
In Section 5, we show that any rational proof protocol can be converted to one
where the payments are 0 or 1, where 1 represents “acceptance of claim c” and 0
represents “rejection of claim c”. In such a protocol, the probability of acceptance
is then exactly equal to the expected payment of the provers. Informally, utility
gap then is, for a given x, the difference between the probability that V accepts
(V, ~P ) where P makes an honest claim c about x and the probability that V
accepts a (V, ~P ′) where ~P ′ makes a dishonest claim c′ about x.
Definition 2 ([17]). Let L be a language with a rational proof protocol (V, ~P )
and let γ(n) ≥ 0. We say that (V, ~P ) has an γ(n)-utility gap if for any input x
with |x| = n, any strategy profile s of ~P that maximizes the expected payment,
and any other strategy profile s′, where the answer bit c′ under s′ does not match
the answer bit c under s, i.e., c′ 6= c, then u(s)− u(s′) > 1/γ(n).
Relationship between utility gap and budget. The budget is the total
expected payment that a verifier can give in a protocol.
Utility gap and budget are closely related. To study utility gaps consistently,
we maintain a fixed O(1) budget.7 This is because utility gap scales naturally
with the payment—a polynomial utility gap under a constant budget is the same
as a constant utility gap under a sufficiently-large polynomial budget.
2.2 Analyzing Computational Costs of Rational Proofs
Our primary focus in this paper is analyzing the various computational costs of
rational interactive proofs. The different parameters fall into two categories.
7 In contrast, Azar and Micali [4] maintain a polynomial-size budget.
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Verification costs. A verifier has three main resources: running time, space
usage and its randomness.
In Section 3, we focus on time-efficient O(log n) time verifiers. Thus, their
space and randomness is also O(log n). We denote the class of languages that
have time-efficient RIP protocols, that is, protocols with a O(log n) time verifier
as RIPt. Multi-prover notation MRIPt is analogous. Similar to the literature
on “probabilistically checkable proofs of proximity” (PCPPs) [6, 7, 32, 46], we
assume that the verifier has random access to the input string and the proof
tape. Thus, if the messages sent by the provers is C(n) bits, the verifier needs
at least O(logC(n)) time to index a random location of the transcript.
As a logarithmic verifier cannot even read the entire input, it is difficult
to obtain protocols with good utility gap guarantees using these verifier. To
achieve better utility gap, in Section 4, we restrict the verifier’s space usage and
randomness, instead of its running time and consider verifiers that use O(log n)
space and O(log n) randomness. We denote the class of languages that have an
RIP protocol with space- and randomness-efficient verifiers, that is, verifiers with
O(log n) space and O(log n) randomness as RIPs,r.
Protocol costs. A rational interactive proof protocol has three main ingredi-
ents: communication cost, number of rounds of interaction and utility gap.8
In Section 3, we study the effect of varying the communication complexity of
a protocol on its power when we have a logarithmic time verifier. The number
of rounds in all the protocols in the paper is O(1).
We denote the class of languages that have an RIP protocol with com-
munication cost C(n), number of rounds k(n) and utility gap γ(n) as
RIP[C(n), k(n), γ(n)]. The multi-prover version is defined similarly.
3 Verification in Logarithmic Time
In this section we consider time-efficient verifiers that run in time logarith-
mic in the input size. We show that for time-efficient verifiers, access to multi-
ple provers is fundamentally linked to the communication cost of the protocol:
any single-prover protocol with high communication costs can be reduced to
a communication-efficient multi-prover protocol. On the other hand, multiple
provers give no extra power for communication-efficient protocols.
Since the utility gap of all the protocols in this section is polynomial in n, we
drop it from the notation for simplicity. Thus, an RIP protocol with a O(log n)-
time verifier that has communication complexity C(n) and round complexity
k(n) is denoted as RIPt[C(n), k(n)].
8 The number of provers is an additional parameter in MRIP protocols, but we ignore
this so as not to overload notation. All the MRIP protocols in this paper have two
provers and all the upper bounds work even with polynomially many provers.
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Constant communication. We first show that multiple provers do not in-
crease the power of a rational proof system when the communication complexity
of the protocol is very small, that is, only O(1) bits. Recall that with a single
prover, RIPt[O(log n), O(log n)] = RIPt[O(log n), O(1)] = UniformTC0 [4, 30].
Theorem 1. MRIPt[O(1), O(1)] = UniformTC0.
Proof. The lower bound follows directly from the single prover result [4, 30].
Now, we prove that MRIPt[O(1), O(1)] ⊆ UniformTC0.
Let L be a language with a k-round MRIP protocol (V, ~P ) where V runs in
O(log n) time, and the transcript of (V, ~P ) has size O(1), where k is a constant.
Note that the strategy profile s of the provers ~P for a protocol with O(1)
communication can be specified in O(1) bits. Thus, there can be at most O(1)
possible strategy profiles for the provers to choose from. We first construct a
circuit that decides L and then show that the circuit can be simulated by a
UniformTC0 machine.
We construct the gates in independent blocks (i.e. there are no wires between
two gates in different blocks). We denote the ith block by Gi for 1 ≤ i ≤ t
for some constant t. The purpose of Gi is to “try out” strategy profile s
i. In
particular, the output of the block Gi is the expected payment over all possible
coin flips of the verifier when the strategy followed by the provers is si. All blocks
finally output their solution (the expected payment) to a single max gate that
finds the maximum over the expected payments.
The structure inside a block Gi is as follows: for each possible randomness r
of the verifier we have an input wire to the block gate (note that there are at
most polynomially many r). Given r, executing the strategy of the provers in
a step by step manner (using the truth table) can be simulated by a depth k
circuit using using AND, OR, and NOT gates. Thus, for each r, a constant sized
circuit can compute the final payment.
Finally, a SUM gate at the end of Gi can sum over the payments to compute
the expected payment.9 This final expectation is the output of the block Gi.
The final MAX gate over the output all Gi gives the maximum possible
expected reward. If the first bit of the corresponding strategy matches the first
bit of the MRIP protocol’s transcript, then the circuit outputs 1, else 0.
We note that the above circuit structure can be simulated by a constant-
depth uniform threshold circuit since SUM gates and MAX gates with polyno-
mial input wires can be implemented using UniformTC0 circuits [4].
Logarithmic and polynomial communication. We characterize the power
of MRIP protocols with O(log n)-time verification, when the communication
complexity of the protocol is logarithmic and polynomial in n.
Theorem 2. MRIPt[poly(n), poly(n)] = MRIPt[O(log(n)), O(1)] = P||
NP.
9 We could normalize by dividing by the number of possible r, but this scaling is
unnecessary as we only care about relative payments.
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Azar and Micali [4] characterized the class PNP|| in terms of single-prover
rational proofs with O(log n) verification and O(poly(n)) communication. In
particular, they proved that RIP[O(poly(n)), O(1)] = PNP|| .
To prove Theorem 2, we first show that using two provers reduces the com-
munication complexity of the RIP protocol for PNP|| exponentially. In fact, we
show prove a more general statement—any MRIP protocol (thus any RIP pro-
tocol as well) with a logarithmic time verifier and polynomial communication
can be simulated using two provers, five rounds and logarithmic communication.
Lemma 1. A MRIP protocol with p(n) procers, k(n) rounds, verification com-
plexity T (n), and communication complexity of C(n) can be simulated by an
MRIP protocol with 2 provers, 5 rounds, verification complexity O(T (n) +
logC(n)) and communication complexity O(T (n) + logC(n)).
Proof. Let (V, ~P ) be the MRIP protocol for a language L with p(n) provers
where V ’s running time is T (n) and C(n) bits of communication are exchanged
over k(n) rounds. Without loss of generality, suppose each message is of length
ℓ(n). Note that k(n) ≤ C(n) and ℓ(n) ≤ C(n). We shift and scale the payment
function R of (V, ~P ) such that R ∈ [0, 1]. The 2-prover 5-round MRIP protocol
(V ′, P ′1, P
′
2) in Figure 1 simulates (V,
~P ).
For any input string x of length n, the protocol (V ′, P ′1, P
′
2) works as follows.
1. P ′1 sends m1 to V
′, where m1 is the message sent by P1 in the first round
of (V, ~P ) according to the best strategy profile s of ~P . V ′ outputs c, the
first bit of m1 at the end of the protocol.
2. V ′ generates the random string r used by V in (V, ~P ) and sends it to P ′1.
3. P ′1 sends a string m˜, which is a concatenation of bits accessed by V in
order in the transcript ~m = (V, ~P )(x, r, s).
4. V ′ chooses a round j from {1, 2 . . . , k(n)}, a prover index i ∈ {1, . . . , p(n)}
and a bit index k from {1, 2, . . . , ℓ(n)} uniformly at random.
5. V ′ simulates V using m˜ and sends all messages sent by V to Pi up to
round j − 1 to P2.
6. P2 sends a bit b to V
′, where b represents the kth bit of the round-j
message sent by Pi in (V, ~P ).
7. V ′ simulates V to check if V ever accesses the kth bit of Pi’s round j
message in ~m. If V does not, then the protocol ends and R′ = 0.
8. Finally, V ′ computes the payment R′ as follows.
(a) If b does not match the kth bit of Pi’s round-j message in m˜, R
′ = −1.
(b) Else, V ′ computes the payment R in (V, ~P ), and R′ = R/(2C(n)).
Fig. 1. MRIP protocol simulating an RIP protocol for L ∈ RIP[T (n), C(n)].
The string m˜ in step 3 is the effective transcript of the protocol (V, ~P ). Since
V runs in time T (n), for a given randomness r, V can access at most T (n) bits
from the C(n)-size transcript ~m of the protocol (P, V ). Thus, |m˜| ≤ T (n).
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Furthermore, since any index i, j where 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ(n) and 1 ≤ j ≤ k(n)
is of size at most O(logC(n)), the communication complexity of the protocol
(V ′, P ′1, P
′
2) is O(T (n) + logC(n)). Similarly, i, j, k can be randomly selected in
O(logC(n)) time, leading to total time O(T (n) + logC(n)).
We now prove correctness of the protocol in Figure 1. Note that P ′2 commits
to a strategy profile s′ of the provers ~P in step 6. We consider two cases.
Case 1. For some randomness r, suppose P ′1 and P
′
2 do not agree on the effective
transcript m˜. Then without loss of generality, there exist indices i, j, k such that
the corresponding bit is part of the effective transcript, and the verification in
step 8 fails with R′ = −1. The probability that V ′ chooses such indices i, j, k in
step 4 is at least 1/C(n). Thus, the expected payment of the provers is at most:
−1
(
1
C(n)
)
+
R
2C(n)
(
C(n)− 1
C(n)
)
≤ 1
C(n)
(
R
2
− 1
)
< 0,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that R ≤ 1. If P ′1 and P ′2 are
consistent on m˜ and r (keeping the rest of their strategy the same) they can
improve their expected payment since their payment under r would be least 0.
Thus, this case does not occur under the best strategy profile of P ′1 and P
′
2.
Case 2. P ′1 and P
′
2 agree on the effective transcript m˜ for every randomness r,
but the answer bit c′ under the strategy s′ committed by P2 for ~P is incorrect.
For a given randomness r and indices i, j, and k such that V accesses kth bit
of the round-j message of Pi in (V, ~P ), R
′ = R(s′, x)/(2C(n)), where R(s′, x) is
the payment of protocol (V, ~P ) under strategy s′. By the correctness and utility
gap of (V, ~P ), we know that the expected payment u(s′, x)+1/ poly(n) < u(s, x),
where s is the best strategy of ~P . Thus, in this case, P ′1 and P
′
2 lose a polynomial
amount if they use strategy s′ instead of s.
Lemma 1 demonstrates the importance of two provers over one to save on
communication cost in rational proofs.
Corollary 1. RIPt[O(poly(n)), O(1)] = PNP|| ⊆ MRIPt[O(poly(n)), O(poly(n)] ⊆
MRIP
t[O(log n), O(1)].
To complete the proof Theorem 2, we prove the following upper bound.
Lemma 2. MRIPt[O(log(n)), O(1)] ⊆ PNP|| .
The proof of Lemma 2 is similar to the proof of MRIP[poly(n), poly(n)] ⊆
EXP||NP in [17]. We include it here for completeness.
Proof. Fix a language L ∈ MRIP(log(n), log(n), O(1)) and let (V, ~P ) be an MRIP
protocol for L. Since V runs in O(log n) time, there exists a constant k such that,
for any two payments R and R′ computed by V for some input of length n and
some randomness are such that R 6= R′ ⇒ |R −R′| ≥ 1
nk
.
Moreover, since V uses O(log n) coin flips, there exists another constant k′
such that, when a payment appears with positive probability under some input
of length n, it must appear with probability at least 1
nk′
.
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Therefore, for any input x of length n and any two strategy profiles s˜ and s˜′
of the provers, if the expected payments u(s˜;x) and u(s˜′;x) are different, then
|u(s˜;x)− u(s˜′;x)| ≥ 1
nk+k′
. (1)
Consider the following deterministic oracle Turing machine M : Given any
input x of length n, it divides the interval [0, 1] into 2nk+k
′
subintervals of length
1
2nk+k′
. For any i ∈ {1, . . . , 2nk+k′}, the ith interval is [(i− 1)/2nk+k′, i/2nk+k′ ].
M then makes 4nk+k
′
queries of the form (i, j), where i ∈ {1, ..., 2nk+k′} and
j ∈ {0, 1}. For each query (i, j), if j = 0 then the corresponding question is
“whether there exists a strategy profile s˜ of the provers such that u(s˜;x) is in
the ith interval”; and if j = 1 then the corresponding question is “whether there
exists a strategy profile s˜ such that u(s˜;x) is in the ith interval and the first bit
sent by P1 is c = 1”. Note that all queries are non-adaptive. We say that interval
i is non-empty if the query (i, 0) is answered 1, and empty otherwise.
Given the answers to all the queries, M finds the highest index i∗ such
that the interval i∗ is non-empty. It accepts if (i∗, 1) is answered 1, and rejects
otherwise. Given correct oracle answers, we show that M decides L.
For by the definition of MRIP, there exists a strategy profile whose expected
payment is non-negative and thus in [0, 1]. Thus there exists an interval i such
that (i, 0) is answered 1. Also by definition, the best strategy profile s˜ has the
highest expected payment, and thus u(s˜;x) falls into interval i∗.
By Inequality 1, any strategy profile s˜′ with u(s˜′;x) < u(s˜;x) has u(s˜′;x)
not in interval i∗, since the difference between u(s˜′;x) and u(s˜;x) is larger than
the length of the interval. And so all strategy profiles s˜′ with u(s˜′;x) in interval
i∗ satisfies u(s˜′;x) = u(s˜;x), that is, they are all the best strategy profiles of the
provers. P1 must send the same first bit c under all such strategy profiles, c = 1
if and only if x ∈ L, and there does not exist any other strategy profile whose
expected payment falls into interval i∗ but the first bit sent by P1 is different
from c. Thus the answer to (i∗, 1) always equals c, and M accepts iff c = 1.
We now show that the oracle queries can be answered by an NP oracle. Since
the communication complexity is at most O(log n) a strategy profile has size
polynomial in n. Thus, an NP machine can guess a strategy profile s˜, simulate
the protocol, and compute the expected payment u(s˜;x).
4 Verification in Logarithmic Space
The protocols in Section 3 have a polynomial utility gap. For a constant budget
this means that the provers who mislead the verifier to an incorrect answer lose
at least 1/ poly(n) of their expected payment.
As utility gap is analogous to the soundness gap in classical proofs, which
is constant (independent of n), it is desirable to have rational protocols with
constant utility gap as well.
Constant utility gap is difficult to achieve when the verifier is O(log n) time
and cannot even read the entire input. This is true even for classical proofs with
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a O(log n)-time verifier where the soundness conditioned is weakened to design
“proofs of proximity” [6, 7, 32, 46]. In particular, the soundness guarantees of
such proofs depend on how far (usually in terms of hamming distance) the input
string x is from the language L. We note that all existing O(log n)-time rational
proofs [4, 30, 31] have polynomial utility gap (under a constant budget).
To design protocols with a strong utility gap such as logarithmic or constant,
in this section we consider verifier’s that use only O(log n) space and randomness.
Let γ(n) be any polynomial-time computable function (given 1n) that is
polynomially bounded. For example, γ(n) can be a constant, logn, or
√
n. We
prove the characterization in general for a utility gap of γ(n).
Theorem 3. Let P
NP[γ(n)]
|| be a polynomial-time Turing machine that can make
O(γ(n)) non-adaptive queries to an NP oracle. This class is equivalent to the
class of languages that have a one-round RIP protocol with a logspace verifier,
polynomial communication and γ(n)-utility gap. That is,
RIP
r,s[poly(n), 1, γ(n)] = P
NP[γ(n)]
|| .
First, we give a space-efficient RIP for the class NP using the log-space inter-
active proof for the language given by Condon and Ladner [19] as a blackbox.
Lemma 3. NP ∈ RIPr,s[poly(n), 1, γ(n)].
Proof. Let (V, P ) denote the 1-round log-space interactive proof for a language
L ∈ NP given in [19]. The one-round log-space RIP for Λ, (V ′, P ′) is given. P ′
sends message m′ which is the concatenation of answer bit c with a bit string
m. If c = 0, then m can be a null string. If c = 1, then m must be the message
sent by P in (V, P ). If c = 0, then R = 1/2 and the protocol ends. Otherwise,
V ′ simulates V using m and if V accepts, then R = 1, else R = 0.
The verifier V ′ uses the same space as V , that is, O(log n). The communica-
tion of (V ′, P ′) is the same as (V, P ), that is, polynomial in n.
We now argue correctness and show that the protocol has constant utility
gap. Suppose x ∈ L and P sends a message with answer bit c′ = 0, then his
expected payment is 1/2. On the other hand, if P sends c = 1, his expected
payment can be 1 by the completeness guarantee of (V, P ). Thus in this case
the expected payment loss of P is constant. Now suppose x /∈ L and P sends
the answer bit c′ = 1. From the soundness guarantee of (V, P ), V accepts with
probability at most 1/3, and thus the expected payment of P is at most 1/3.
On the other hand, if P sent c = 0, his expected payment would have been 1/2.
Thus in this case P loses a constant amount as well.
For the lower bound, we use a different but equivalent complexity class. Let
L
NP[γ(n)]
|| be a logarithmic space machine that can make O(γ(n)) non-adaptive
queries to an NP oracle. Wagner [47] showed that L
NP[γ(n)]
|| = P
NP[γ(n)]
|| .
Lemma 4. P
NP[γ(n)]
|| = L
NP[γ(n)]
|| ⊆ RIPr,s[poly(n), 1, γ(n)]
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Proof. Consider any language L ∈ LNP[γ(n)]|| . LetM be the logarithmic-space ma-
chine with at most γ(n) nonadaptive accesses to an oracle O for an NP language
that decides L. Without loss of generality, suppose M makes exactly γ(n) ≥ 1
non-adaptive queries to O. The RIP protocol for L uses the RIP protocol for
NP, given in Lemma 3, to simulate the oracle queries.
For any input x of length n, the protocol (V, P ) works as follows. Let Rn = 0.
1. P sends a message c, (c1,m1), (c2,m2), . . . , (cγ(n),mγ) to V , where c is
the answer bit of the entire protocol, and ci is the answer bit for the ith
oracle query qi generated by M and mi is the corresponding proof for qi
based on Lemma 3. V outputs c at the end of the protocol.
2. V simulates M on x until M outputs queries q1, . . . , qγ(n).
3. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , γ(n)}, V simulates V ′ in the RIP protocol for NP
in Lemma 3. In particular, V uses the message mi as the prover’s message
in the protocol of Lemma 3. Let c∗i and R
∗
i be the answer bit and the
payment in that protocol respectively. V returns c∗i as the oracle’s answer
for qi, and updates the sum Rn ← Rn +R∗i .
4. V continues simulating M till the end. If c does not match M ’s output,
then R = −1; otherwise R = Rn/γ(n).
Fig. 2. An RIP protocol for L
NP[γ(n)]
||
.
We now prove correctness of the protocol in Figure 2. Note that an honest
strategy of P , that is, reporting the correct answer bits c, c1, . . . , cγ(n), and send-
ing correct proof strings mi whenever ci = 1, leads to a payment R ≥ 1/2 (this
is because of the payment-structure of the protocol for NP in Lemma 3).
Suppose P reports the incorrect answer bit c′, then either (a) the output of
M in Step 4 does not match c′ and R = −1; or (b) there exists an NP query qi
such that the answer bit c∗i is incorrect.
In case (a), the expected payment loss of P is at least 1/2+1 = 3/2 > 1/γ(n),
as γ(n) ≥ 1. In case (b), because the protocol in Lemma 3 has O(1) utility gap,
the provers’ expected payment loss in the overall protocol is 1/O(γ(n)).
To complete the proof of Theorem 3 we prove the following upper bound.
Lemma 5. RIPr,s[poly(n), 1, γ(n)] ⊆ PNP[γ(n)]||
Proof. Given any L ∈ γ(n)-RIP, let (V, P ) be the a 1-round RIP protocol for
L with γ(n) utility gap, where V uses O(log n) space and the communication
complexity is O(poly(n)).
Consider a polynomial-time Turing machine M which can make γ(n) non-
adaptive accesses to an NP oracle O. Given any input x of length n, M divides
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[0, 1] into 2γ(n) intervals, each of length 1/(2γ(n)). That is, the ith interval is
[i/2γ(n), (i+ 1)/2γ(n)) for each i ∈ {1, . . . , 2γ(n)− 1}.
For each such interval, M queries its oracle O:
1. Does there exist a message m sent by P such that the expected payment
u(V,P )(s;x) is in the ith interval?
2. Does there exist a message m sent by P such that the expected payment
u(V,P )(s;x) is in the ith interval and the corresponding answer bit c = 1?
M makes O(γ(n)) non-adaptive queries and clearly runs in polynomial time.
We now show that it is sufficient for the oracle O to be an NP machine.
The key point to note here is that protocol is one round and thus the size of a
provers’ strategy is polynomial in n. Thus, an NP oracle can guess a strategy and
compute a payment R(s, x, (V, P )). Since the verifier uses O(log n) randomness,
an NPmachine can enumerate over all possible polynomial coin flips and compute
the expected payment u(V,P )(s, x). If u(V,P )(s, x) is in the ith interval the oracle
returns 1 to query (1) and 0 otherwise. Similarly, if u(V,P )(s, x) is in the ith
interval and c = 1 for this strategy, the oracle responds 1 to query (2) and 0
otherwise. Thus, M ’s queries can be answered by an NP oracle.
Finally, M finds the highest index i∗ such that the oracle returns 1 to
query (1) with respect to the i∗. M accepts if the oracle returns 1 to query 2 for
the i∗th interval, and rejects otherwise.
To see whyM decides L given correct answers to its oracle queries, note that
the maximum expected payment u(V,P )(s
∗;x) that P can get falls in the i∗th
interval. As (V, ~P ) has γ(n)-utility gap, by construction and definition of utility
gap, all strategies with expected payments in the i∗th interval must have the
same answer bit c as that in s∗. Thus, x ∈ L if and only if c = 1, which occurs
if and only if the oracle’s answer to query 2 for interval i∗ is 1.
5 Relationship Between Classical and Rational Proofs
In this section, we show under what conditions does a rational interactive proof
reduces to a classical interactive proof. The results in this section are stated in
terms of the multi-prover model (that is, MRIP and MIP) which is more general,
and thus they also hold for the single prover model (that is, RIP and IP).
To compare the two proof models, we explore their differences. In rational
interactive proofs, the provers are allowed to give an answer bit c = 1 claiming
x ∈ L or c = 0 claiming x /∈ L.10 In other words, the question is “is x ∈ L?” and
the rational provers can say “yes” or “no” based on their incentives. Furthermore,
for a particular input x of size n, if the provers’ claim c about x is incorrect,
they lose at least a 1/γ(n), where γ(n) is the utility gap.
On the other hand, in classical proofs, the provers are only allowed to prove
membership, that is, they are only allowed to prove x ∈ L. Furthermore, given
completeness and soundness parameters c and s respectively, where 0 ≤ s < c ≤
1, we have that “for any x ∈ L”, there exists a strategy such that V accepts
10 Thus it is not surprising that rational proofs are closed under complement.
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with probability at least c and “for any x /∈ L”, for any strategy V rejects with
probability at most s. Thus, given L, the guarantees are independent of x.
In this section, we show that a rational proof reduces to a classical proof.
Intuitively, this happens when the utility gap guarantee of a rational protocol is
made to hold for all x and in particular, it is enforced to be the gap between the
expected payments for all x ∈ L and all x /∈ L.
We first show that without loss of generality we can restrict the payments of
the provers in a rational proof protocol to be either 1 or 0, where 1 corresponds
to “accept” and 0 to “reject” respectively.
Lemma 6. Any MRIP protocol (V, ~P ) with payment R ∈ [0, 1] and utility gap
γ(n) can be simulated by a MRIP protocol (V ′, ~P ) with payment R′ ∈ {0, 1} and
utility gap γ(n)/2. In particular, for any strategy s and any input x,
u(V,~P)(x; s) ≤ u(V ′, ~P )(x; s) ≤ u(V,~P)(x; s) + γ(n)/2.
V ′ uses 1 + ⌈log2 γ(n)⌉ more random bits than V .
Proof. We will go one by one through the payments made in the rational protocol
(V, ~P ) and replace them with payments in {0, 1}. At a high level, V ′ makes a
payment 1 in (V ′, ~P ′) with probabilityR(x, r, ~m) whereR(x, r, ~m) is the payment
made by V in (V, ~P ) , and 0 otherwise.
Assume without loss of generality that each random string r is a bit string
that corresponds exactly to the result of |r| coin flips. Let G = 21+⌈log2 γ(n)⌉;
thus 1/G ≤ 1/2γ(n).
We create a new protocol (V ′, ~P ′). First, V ′ runs the original protocol (V, ~P )
to obtain a transcript ~m (given the provers’ strategy s) and randomness r of V .
Let R(x, r, ~m) be the payment made by V . Then, V ′ flips 1 + ⌈log2 γ(n)⌉ extra
coins; call this string r′. Momentarily treat r′ as an integer. If r′ ≤ ⌈G·R(x, r, ~m)⌉
then V ′ pays 1; otherwise V ′ pays 0. Let this final payment be denoted by
R(x, r ◦ r′, ~m).
Note that in the above, because r′ is uniformly selected from G distinct
values, for any r, the V ′ pays 1 with probability
Er′ [R(x, r ◦ r′, ~m)] = ⌈G ·R(x, r, ~m)⌉
G
;
thus
R(x, r, ~m) ≤ Er′ [R(x, r ◦ r′, ~m)] ≤ R(x, r, ~m) + 1/G ≤ R(x, r, ~m) + 1/2γ(n).
The expected payment of the original protocol on input x and transcript
~m is
∑
r R(x, r, ~m) Pr(r). The expected payment of the new protocol is (using
independence of r′ and r)
Er,r′[R(x, r ◦ r′, ~m)] =
∑
r
∑
r′
R(x, r ◦ r′, ~m) Pr(r′) Pr(r)
=
∑
r
Er′ [R(x, r ◦ r′, ~m)] Pr(r).
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Substituting with the above, the expected payment is bounded by
∑
r
R(x, r, ~m) Pr(r) ≤ Er,r′ [R(x, r ◦ r′, ~m)] ≤ 1/2γ(n)+
∑
r
R(x, r, ~m) Pr(r).
Given any rational protocol with zero-one payments, we note that it imme-
diately gives us an accept-reject protocol such that for a given x, the probability
that the verifier accepts is exactly the expected payment of the original protocol.
More formally let (V, ~P ) be a rational protocol with R ∈ {0, 1} and utility gap
γ(n). Let (V ′, ~P ′) be defined as follows: V ′ simulates V , ignores the answer bit
c, and if the payment in (V, ~P ) is R = 1 then accept, else reject.
Thus, for a given input string x, the expected payment in (V, ~P ) is equal to
the probability that V ′ accepts in (V ′, ~P ′). That is,
u(V,~P)(x; s) = Er[R(x, r, (V,
~P )(x, r, s))] =
∑
r
Pr(r | R(x, r, (V, ~P )(x, r, s)) = 1)
=
∑
r
Pr(r | V ′accepts (V ′, ~P ′)) = Pr(V ′ accepts (V ′, ~P ′)). (2)
Furthermore, (V ′, ~P ′) satisfies the following instance-specific properties similar
to completeness and soundness in interactive proofs. For any x ∈ L, let s∗
denote the optimal strategy of the provers ~P , that is, s∗ maximizes their ex-
pected payment. Then for ~P ′ following s∗, V ′ accepts with probability exactly
c(x, n) = u(V,~P )(x; s
∗). Furthermore, we know from the utility gap condition that
for any x /∈ L, for any strategy s′, the probability that V ′ accepts is at most
u(V,~P)(x; s
′) < u(V,~P)(x; s
∗)− 1/γ(n), that is, the probability that V ′ accepts is
at most s(x, n) < c(x, n)− 1/γ(n). Similar guarantees hold for any x /∈ L.
However, if we want (V ′, ~P ′) to be an interactive proof protocol in the clas-
sical sense, that is, with completeness and soundness guarantees that hold for
all x ∈ L and for all x /∈ L respectively, we need to impose restrictions on the
expected payment function of the rational protocol.
Theorem 4. Let (V, ~P ) be an MRIP protocol for a language L such that
min
x∈L
u(V,~P)(x; s
∗) > max
x/∈L
u(V,~P)(x; s
∗) +
1
γ(n)
(3)
where x is any input of length n, s∗ is the strategy of the provers that maximizes
their expected payment in (V, ~P ) and γ(n) is any function such that γ(n) > 1
and γ = O(poly(n)). Then, (V, ~P ) can be simulated by a MIP protocol for L.
We prove this theorem in two parts. First, we show prove the following lemma
which proves Theorem 4 with weak completeness and soundness guarantees.
Lemma 7. Let (V, ~P ) be an MRIP protocol for a language L that satisfies the
condition 3 in Theorem 4. Then, (V, ~P ) can be simulated by MIP protocol with
completeness and soundness parameters c(n) and s(n) respectively such that
c(n) > s(n) + 1/2γ(n) and c(n), s(n) ≥ 0.
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Proof. Using Lemma 6, without loss of generality, let the payment of (V, ~P ) be
R ∈ {0, 1}. Since the expected reward under each strategy is changed by at
most 1/2γ(n), the condition of Theorem 4 is still satisfied with γ(n) ← 2γ(n).
In the MIP protocol (V ′, ~P ), V ′ simulates V , ignores the answer bit c, and if the
payment in (V, ~P ) is 1, then accepts, else rejects. For a given x, the expected
payment in (V, ~P ) is equal to the probability that V ′ accepts; see Equation 2.
Define c(n) = minx∈L u(V,~P)(x, r, s
∗) and s(n) = maxx/∈L u(V,~P)(x, r, s
∗).
Then, by definition, we have c(n), s(n) ≥ 0 and c(n) > s(n) + 1/2γ(n).
We now show that c(n) and s(n) are the completeness and soundness parame-
ter of the MIP (V ′, ~P ′) respectively. For any x ∈ L, there exists ~P ′ where ~P ′ uses
a strategy s∗, such that the probability V ′ accepts is exactly u(V,~P)(x, s
∗) ≥ c(n).
For any x /∈ L, for all ~P ′ using any strategy s, the probability V ′ accepts is
exactly u(V,~P)(x, s) ≤ u(V,~P)(x, s∗) ≤ s(n). Thus, (V ′, ~P ′) is an MIP with com-
pleteness and soundness parameters c(n) and s(n) respectively.
We amplify the “gap” of an MIP by repeating the protocol sufficiently many
times and then using Chernoff bounds. The techniques are mostly standard,
although the parameters must be set carefully to deal with the case s(n) = 0.
Lemma 8. Given an MIP protocol for a language L, with completeness c(n) > 0
and soundness s(n) ≥ 0 such that c(n) > s(n) + 1/γ′(n) for some γ′(n) > 1 and
γ′ = O(poly(n)), can be converted to an MIP protocol for L with completeness
at least 1− 1/ poly(n) and soundness at most 1/ poly(n).
Proof. We repeat the MIP protocol ρ(n) = 96(logn)γ′(n)2/c(n) times and ac-
cept if more than τ(n) = ρ(n)c(n)(1 − 1/4γ′(n)) of the instances end in accept.
Let the random indicator variable Xi be 1 if the verifier in the ith repetition
accepts, otherwise Xi = 0. Let X =
∑ρ(n)
i=1 Xi be the total number of accepts.
Consider an x ∈ L. Then if provers use their best strategy of the original
MIP protocol in each iteration, we have
E[X ] = E

ρ(n)∑
i=1
Xi

 =
ρ(n)∑
i=1
E [Xi] ≥
ρ(n)∑
i=1
c(n) = c(n)ρ(n).
Using Chernoff bounds, we obtain11
Pr(X < τ(n)) = Pr
(
X <
(
1− 1
4γ′(n)
)
c(n)ρ(n)
)
≤ e−
c(n)ρ(n)
32γ′(n)2 < 1/n.
Now consider an x /∈ L. For any strategy of the provers, by the soundness
guarantee at most s(n) of the original protocol (and using linearity of expectation
11 This uses a slight extension of Chernoff bounds that uses a bound on the expectation
rather than the expectation itself; see Exercise 4.7 in [43] for example.
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as above) we have E(X) ≤ s(n)ρ(n) < ρ(n)(c(n) − 1/2γ′(n)). Note c(n) −
1/2γ′(n) > c(n)/2 and τ(n) > ρ(n)(c(n)−1/2γ′(n))(1+1/4γ′(n)). Then we can
use the following Chernoff bound
Pr(X > τ(n)) ≤ Pr
(
X >
(
1 +
1
4γ′(n)
)
ρ(n)(c(n) − 1/2γ′(n))
)
≤ e−ρ(n)(c(n)−1/2γ′(n))/48γ′(n)2 ≤ e−ρ(n)c(n)/96γ′(n)2 ≤ 1/n.
The same analysis extends to any 1/ poly(n) instead of 1/n when ρ(n) is
increased by a constant.
Remark 1. The repetition of the MIP protocol to amplify its completeness and
soundness guarantee used in Lemma 8 is not efficient as it blows up the number
of rounds. There exist more efficient techniques to amplify IP guarantees by
parallel repetition that can be used instead; for example, see [5, 23, 28, 44].
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